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On 08/03/2025 13:55, Roger L Costello costello@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
Hi Folks,inaccuracies. /Roger
This particular vulnerability is more about Saxon having a configuration property allowedProtocols that you can set to e.g. "https,http" to that way explicitly allow only HTTPS and HTTP URI to be resolved in the context of XML/XSLT/XQuery/XPath while file URI access should fail; however, currently, while I think which such a setting doing e.g. B unparsed-text('file:///etc/password') is blocked, the resolver (chain?) Saxon sets up detects the prohibited file URI access in the entity resolution but somehow fails to block the parsing of the XML (or at least the external entity referencing a local file).
could use the program to read and display the contents of any file on your machine. This is a vulnerability. The SAXON team is working to fix this vulnerability.
XML--which is a string--may then be dynamically processed using the XPath parse-xml(string) function. Let's dig into dynamically generated XML that can read arbitrary files on your machine.
the ' symbol. You can create your own user-defined entities using <!ENTITY args>, where args is the name of the new entity--e.g., xxe (not a very readable entity name, that's okay)--followed by the value for the entity. The value may be given in-line as a string, or a file may be referenced to provide the value. Let's assign xxe the value of the Windows/win.ini file. Follow xxe with the keyword SYSTEM and then the location to the file. Here's how to create a user-defined xxe entity whose value is the content of the Windows/win.ini file: uses--displays--the value of the xxe entity: understandable. "file:///Windows/win.ini">
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